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Employment practices in the Nordic countries have been described as unique in
Europe. Special traits such as high work discretion, few work foremen and a
widespread employee involvement in managerial desicions contribute to this par-
ticular structure. When we consider cooperation, we often focus on representation
and influence on decicion making. Both local and more collective, centralized bar-
gaining are key factors. Other interesting potential indicators of cooperation are
the levels of worker turnover in the industry or firm which may be related to the
level of cooperation and employment quality, and indicators such as educational
levels, work-related training and possibilities for career development within the
firm.
The focus of my thesis are the following questions: Do Nordic firms cooperate
more than other firms in similar industries in Europe, and how does this affect
profitability and employment quality in the Nordic countries? Related to this is
the questtion: Does Norway perform better than other European countries on in-
dicators of employment quality? Any direct effects of influence and cooperation
on productivity, and in the Nordic countries in particular, are largely unexplored.
Some studies have implied a positive correlation between productivity and repre-
sentation, but the picture is generally mixed.
Increased competition in product markets, both nationally and internationally, has
been suggested as a contributor to institutional changes. The increasing diversity
in the global economy, decentralization of earlier collective bargaining structures,
which has been observed in the majority of EU countries (Traxler, 2003), and di-
version in workplace practices make these issues more than relevant than ever.
I will present a survey of the literature relating to participation and cooperation
in the workplace, in addition to the literature connected to employment quality. I
will also present some anecdotal evidence from interviews with managers and union
members of the ERAMET factory in the city of Porsgrunn in Norway, where a
large reorganization of work practices has been done based on the idea of worker
involvement and self-directed teams. In addition to this, I will compare data from
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the employment quality survey in the EU-countries with similar Norwegian data.
In the first section about information and coordination problems in labour mar-
ket I will describe some of the most important coordination problems that arises
between managers and workers, and introduce institutions as a way of reducing
these problems. The Varieties of Capitalism approach will be used in order to
explain national institutional differences and how these differences may result in
differences in how the coordination problems are resolved.
In the second section I will compare the European and the Norwegian labour
market. The Norwegian welfare model is presented, and the background for
the widespread collective bargaining and representative participation which rose
from the cooperation trials and legislation is described. The literature on effect
of participation on productivity, performance and quality of working life is de-
scribed.Furthermore, I compare Norwegian and European data on different mea-
sures on employment quality, and review some of the literature on the effect of
employment quality and job performance. The sustainability of institutions are
briefly discussed.
In the third section, I describe how ERAMET, a manganese production factory
in Porsgrunn, Norway, has implemented a new work practice with self-directed
teams and increased job autonomy, in order to increase production efficiency. I
will compare production and turnover data of the production in ERAMET Norway
and production and turnover data in an ERAMET factory in Dunkirk, France.
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2 Information and Coordination Problems in Labour Markets
”Institutions are a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally follow,
whether for normative, cognitive or material reasons, and organizations as durable
entities with formally recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the in-
stitutions of the political economy(North, 1990).”
Institutions are sometimes used as a way of reducing coordination problems and
information asymmetries in markets. In order to discuss Norwegian labour market
institutions and institutions in general, I will present these problems, and link them
to the Varieties of Capitalism approach of explaining institutional differences. In
the following, I will first look at coordination problems, and problems linked to
information asymmetries, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, and apply
these to more spesific labour contexts.
One of the methods used for leviating some of the efficiency problems linked to
coordination and information problems, are institutions, both formal and informal.
Labour institutions, and their efficiency are therefore closely linked to efficiency in
the labour market in general, but these institutions may vary between countries.
The literature suggests that institutions that serve to reduce inefficiencies in some
types of political economies may not produce efficient outcomes in countries that do
not share the same characteristics in terms of history and culture, which is further
discussed in the section on Varieties of Capitalism. I will start by presenting some
of the most common coordination and information problems, and link them to
labour market issues, and review some of the industrial relations literature that
has tried to suggest institutional solutions to some of these problems.
Pareto coordination games
An important challenge in the area of working life is to get the different parties
in the labour market, such as workers and managers, to coordinate on mutually
beneficial outcomes. Coordination on vocational training, which is both benefi-
cial for the employer because of the possible productivity gains and for workers
which may gain more discretion at work and possible also monetary payoffs. Even
though the benefits are evident for both parties, there is no guarantee that the
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most beneficial equilibrium will be realized.
Zero sum games
A zero sum game is defined as a game where there always is one winner and one
loser, and the advantage recieved by one player will be exactly equal to the disad-
vantage of the other. Zero-sum games have been used to describe different aspects
of working life, most notably the distribution of power between workers and man-
agement. The Taylorism Thesis suggest this, implying that an increase in worker
autonomy will reduce the possibilities of the management discretion.
2.1 Incentive problems
Incentive problems are caused by conflicts of interest between the different parties
interacting with each other, and arises as a consequence of asymmetry of informa-
tion, which makes it possible to engage in opportunistic behaviour . There can be
conflicts of interest between workers and management related to the level of effort
which should be executed, and in the sharing of production profit. There can also
be conflicts of interests between the management and the stock holders, between
managemenent and labour organizations, or labour organizations and workers, to
mention a few. I will in the following focus on different types of conflict of interest
between management and workers.
Moral Hazard in Working Life
Moral hazard as an economical concept was first introduced by Arrow (Arrow,
1963) in connection to economics of health care, where the incentive effect of in-
surance is discussed, and the changes in behaviour caused by the insurance. This
can be related to working life by considering the situations where there are possi-
bilities of ”hidden actions”, i.e. actions by the workers which are not observable
by the management, but maybe only indirectly in the form of a noisy signal. Work
effort can in many cases not be measured directly, but only indirectly in the form
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of the level of production which also can be influenced by other variables other
than effort.
I will in the following use a simple contracting framework(Martimort, 2002) where
the principal (here, the management) offers the agent a contract t, which is the
wage the agent recieves. The agent (here, the worker) can exert costly effort e
which influences the level of realized production, q. We normalize the effort levels
such that e is given as either 0 or 1. The disutilty of effort, ϕ(e) is defined as
ϕ(0) = ϕ0 = 0 (1)
ϕ(1) = ϕ1 = ϕ (2)
The agent gets the transfer t from the principal. The utility associated with the
transfer u(t) is increasing and concave, and u(0) = 0 which implies that the agents
have risk averse preferences. Assuming a separable utility function, we can present
the agents utility in this manner:
U = u(t)− ϕ(e) (3)
The level of production is a stochastic variable, which can take two different levels
q (high production) and q (low production). This variable is dependent on the
level of effort, but the production level is not a perfect signal. The probabilities of
a high production level on different levels of effort are given as:
Pr(q = q|e = 0) = pi0 (4)
Pr(q = q|e = 1) = pi1 (5)
where pi0 < pi1
. Since the wages need to be based on measureable levels, the wages, t, are made
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dependent on the stochastic production levels, q. The manager’s value of the pro-
duction is given as S(q) where S ′(q) > 0, S ′′(q) < 0 and S(0) = 0 This yields, for
high levels of production t = t(q) and for low levels of production t = t(q). The
principal’s expected utility is as follows,
V0 = pi0(S(q)− t) + (1− pi0)(S(q)− t) (6)
with no effort (e=0)
V1 = pi1(S(q)− t) + (1− pi1)(S(q)− t) (7)
with effort (e=1)
In order for the contract to be executed, two constraints have to be satisfied.
The first constraint is the individual rationality constraint, which ensures that
accepting the contract is associated with higher expected payoff than declining
it. Second is the incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures that using
high effort must yield a higher payoff than low effort. Another way of stating
incentive compatibility is that there are no conflicts of interest between managers
and workers.
Incentive constraint:
pi1u(t) + (1 + pi1)u(t) ≥ pi0u(t) + (1− pi0)u(t) (8)
Individual rationality constraint:
pi1u(t) + (1− pi1)u(t)− ϕ ≥ 0 (9)
If we assumed risk neutrality, transfering the risk from the manager to the worker
would be without any extra cost, since the workers produce the first-best contract
levels. But since we usually assume that the workers are risk averse, inducing
effort by shifting the risk over to the workers will be costly. This is a result of
wages being dependent on a stochastic production level, where the worker can only
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partially influence the probability of reaching the high production level. There is
a level of uncertainty linked to the wages the worker recieves, and risk aversion
implies that the agent would be willing to pay a risk premium to avoid this inse-
curity. In general, insecurity in relation to wages is connected to a lower level of
job satisfaction.
One of the ways of dealing with the incentive problems linked to moral hazard
and effort levels is to introduce risk-sharing devices such as efficiency wages, stock
options, etc. The solutions to the incentive problems may also be dependent on
how the workers are perceived by the management. If workers are assumed to
be lazy or irresponsible, methods of direct control may be used, but in the case
where workers are assumed to be responsible and motivated, other solutions of this
problem may be more efficient. More on this in section 4. An example of this is
the finding that countries with low levels of trust are more likely to use methods
of direct control and hierarchy in working life than countries with high levels of
trust (Arundel et. al, 2007).
Adverse selection
Adverse selection arises when there are hidden characteristics in contracting, or
asymmetry of information before contracting is done. The problem was intro-
duced by Akerlof(Akerlof, 1970) where the information asymmetry between the
buyers and sellers of used cars leads to there only being cars in the worst condi-
tion (”lemons”) left in the market. The reason for this was that the sellers of the
good cars did not recieve enough money compared to the value of the car, because
of the existence of lemons, which contributed to a reduction of willingness to pay
among consumers without information about the quality of the cars. He showed
how the mere presence of poor quality in a market with information asymmetries
could result in quality deterioration in the entire market, because the high quality
cars were removed from the market.
In order to link this to working life, I will look at a case of high- or low-skilled
workers, where the level of skill is unobservable for the manager(Martimort, 2002).
The workers are thought by nature to either be inefficient and producing with a
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high cost θ, with probability (1−v) or efficient, producing with a low cost, θ, with
probability v . The respective production cost functions are given by:
C(q, θ) = θq + F (10)
with probability v, and
C(q, θ) = θq + F (11)
with probability (1− v)
The spread of uncertainty is given by
∆θ = θ − θ (12)
Complete information
If complete information were possible, the first-best output would be decided by
the marginal value of the firm of production and the marginal cost of the worker,
S ′(q∗) = θ (13)
S ′(q∗) = θ (14)
and the production level would be higher for the most efficient type. Since the
principal in the full information case can observe the agents type, the different
types are offered different contracts, which satisfy their participation constraints:
t− θq ≥ 0 (15)
t− θq ≥ 0 (16)
Because of complete information, the firm will extract the entire profit, and the
workers will get transfers/wages equal to their marginal cost of effort.
Incomplete information
In the case of incomplete information, the manager cannot separate between the
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efficient and inefficient workers, and the contract now has to satisfy incentive
compatibility constraints, for the contracts to be feasible.
t− θq ≥ t− θq (17)
t− θq ≥ t− θq (18)
This can be interpreted as follows: The low-skill worker cannot be better off by
choosing the high-skill contract (Equation 17) and for the high skilled workers by
choosing the low-skill contract (Equation 18).
An example of adverse selection in labour relations can be differences in skill levels
among workers. A highly skilled worker will most likely be more productive and
efficient than a low skilled worker, but it is not always possible to separate between
them. One solution to this problem is a shutdown of the least efficient production
type, such that it only satisfies the individual rationality constraints of the efficient
workers. If this is not possible or wanted, some rent has to be paid to the efficient
type in order to ensure incentive compatibility.
Market signals, where the agent can reveal his true type by behaviour correlated
with the abilities which arec harder to measure, is a way to separate between differ-
ent types of agents (Spence, 1973). These signals may be degrees from prestigous
universities which send a signal of ability of hard work and high effort. Another
potential signal is the number of hours spent at work.If the manager cannot ob-
serve the quality of work, a high number of working hours could signal that you are
a high quality worker.This practise is well-known in law firms, where promotions
often are based on ”billed hours” and because of this, lower-level associates work
inefficiently long hours (Landers et al., 1996).
The Hold-up Problem
”The implied demands on the rationality limits of human actors are shown to be
severe and the associated costs of adapting to changing job and market circum-
stances are shown to be considerable for jobs in the idiosyncratic kind. Collec-
tivizing the employment agreement alleviates these conditions in that it serves to
economize on transaction costs in both bounded rationality and attenuate oppor-
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tunism” (Williamsson, Wachter, Harris 1975) The Hold-up problem arises when
there are mutual gains from cooperation between the parties negotiations, but
both parties have to make relation-spesific investments. These investments are
investments that are directly linked to some spesific relation (i.e. training of work-
ers to do spesific tasks more efficiently, investment in a special type of production
equipment etc.) and they have little value if the investments are used in other
relations. This form of commitment may increase one of the parties bargaining
power. Hold-up problems leads to inefficiencies, because both workers and em-
ployers are reluctant to do relation-spesific investments, even though they would
be mutually beneficial. Working life institutions may reduce the inefficiencies from
both information asymmetries and hold-up problems. They are discussed in the
following section.
2.2 Varieties of Capitalism - An Institutional Approach to National
Differences
Why do the levels of innovation and the type of innovation differ among countries?
Why do we see a clustering of some forms of industries and technology in some
countries, but not in others? When introducing the literature of industrial rela-
tions, the theory of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) is essential. The VoC theory is
used to explain institutional differences between countries. In its most simplistic
form, VoC uses two different types of market economies, and explains differences
in innovation and diversity betweeen countries with institutional differences. It
looks at where coordination problems get resolved, and also the differences in so-
lutions to the coordination problems in relation to the institutional structure in
the country(Hancke, 2009).
Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies
The two different categories for the market economies are named Liberal Market
Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). LMEs are used
as a common term for the economic market structure which we observe in countries
such as the UK, the US, Austria, Canada and Australia. The economy is char-
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acterized by fluid markets for production inputs such as labour and capital, and
fierce competition in the product markets. The companies focus on stockholder
value, and avoiding hostile takeovers.
CMEs are used for the rest the countries in Europe along with Japan. The econ-
omy is characterized by a greater deal of collective bargaining, regulations and less
fluid labour and capital markets. There are more widespread cross-shareholdings
and long term involvement with investors and banks. This again allows companies
to focus on other aspects than short-term profit without fearing hostile takeovers
or losing their investors.
In ”An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism.” Hall and Soskice implied that
there would probably be some main differences between both types of market
structure both on the labour market, and in what kinds of innovation one would
see in the different economies (Hancke, 2009). The main difference in innovation
seemed to be a higher amount of radical innovation in the LMEs, and incremental
innovation in CMEs. Radical innovations are often found in areas such as the
farmaceutical industry and in the IT sector, and incremental innovation more in
”traditional” manufacturing industries. This would again create some ”compar-
ative institutional advantages” which would lead to different types of production
and innovation in different countries. To look closer at what these advantages may
be, I will start by naming the five different areas where the coordinations problems
are resolved (Hancke, 2009).
Main Areas of Coordination
In the original VoC theory, the main focus was on four different areas of the po-
litical economy, namely vocational training and education, corporate governance,
inter-firm relations and employees, as areas of institutional coordination. These
are further discussed in the following sections.
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Vocational training
Vocational training and education at the workplace involves investment in spe-
sific skills, and ensuring that these investments are profitable both for the worker
and manager. To explain the differences between the level of specific investment in
training between the CMEs and LMEs, the level of employment security is crucial.
Because of the ”hire and fire” policies which are characteristic for many companies
in LMEs as an effect of fluid labour markets, and the usual career path which often
includes many different companies and tasks, the employees are reluctant to gain
very industry or company-spesific skills, and are more inclined to choose to learn
more general skills which can be utilized in a variety of jobs(Hancke, 2009). Since
the labour market is fluid, the companies who use resources on personell training,
can risk that other companies steal their employees. Because of this free-rider
problem, the industry is therefore greatly dependent on institutions such as voca-
tional schools and universities to give them skilled labour.
In the CMEs, on the other hand, there is a larger extent of employment security.
The companies are not as free to fire and hire and reduce employment (i.e. invol-
untary part-time work) so the employees are not reluctant to gaining company-
spesific skills. A generous unemployment insurance and benefit scheme also makes
sure that you have the possibility of looking for relevant work over a longer time
period after losing your job or entering the job market. Since there is less poach-
ing of skilled employees between sectors, the companies are also more positive
towards providing vocational training and education, i.e. internships. The risk of
some other company stealing your intern when the training is over, is much smaller.
The extreme variety of avoiding the incentive problems which follows vocational
training, is the Japanese lifetime employment model, where employees are given
contracts providing lifetime employment. When given this opportunity, the em-
ployees have no problem with gaining very spesific skills and do not feel threatened
by new technology, since it does not threaten own employment (Gardner, 1998).
There are of course some incentive and efficiency problems related to lifetime em-
ployment, but these are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Inter-firm relations
Inter-firm relations are a way of leviating hold-up problems between suppliers
and clients. They are also a way for firms to share information and experiences
between themselves, and cooperate on areas such as workforce training, how to
reduce sickness leaves and so on. One example of an inter-firm relation is the
Grenland Industry Cluster (ICG) which is a joint effort of the management and
unions in different process industries in Grenland, a district of Norway.1 They
cooperate in the areas of vocational training, security measures, health services
for the employees and maintenance and supply of gas to the industrial park at
Herøya.
Institutions in CMEs and LMEs
In LMEs, institutions are complementary to market as a way of solving coordina-
tion problems. This includes institutions which provide exchange of information
between firms and investors, for example credit rating companies and third-party
analysists, where the same parties also offers monitoring of behavior in order to
reduce moral hazard, and sanctioning of deviant behavior, mainly through the
justice system. Coordinated Market Economies relies on a larger variety of in-
stitutions in order to solve the same problems. All parties rely on coordination
through strategic interaction. Therefore, institutions are created to make the dif-
ferent parties coordinate as efficiently as possible, and there are more institutions
of the deliberative type. These institutions rely on the possibility of credible com-
mitment, and information being shared to reduced the uncertainty regarding the
strategies of the different actors.
Deliberative institutions
Deliberative institutions are institutions which makes it possible for different actors
to cooperate with each other. The Norwegian example of one of these deliberative
1The involved parties are Ineos Polyolefins, Eramet, Herøya Industripark, Ineos Chlor Vinyls,
Norcem, Ineos Olefins (Noretyl), Norske Skog Klosterøya and Yara.
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institutions is the three-party cooperation between the government, the Confeder-
ation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade
Unions (LO).
Institutional Coherence and Macroeconomic Performance
Macroeconomic performance indicators such as inflation, unemployment and eco-
nomic growth have been linked to the degree of institutional coherence in the econ-
omy. This idea was based on institutional complementaries, which implied that
the presence of one institution might increase the efficiency of another(Hancke,
2009). It does not suggest that either LMEs or CMEs are superior in order to
achieve high macroeconomic performance, but that it is linked to the degree of
institutional coherence (countries with institutions based on a high degree of non-
market coordination will be better off if the other institutions also share the same
non-market characteristics, and vice verca).
Limitations and Main Critisisms
The Varieties of Capitalism model has been critized for depending very heavily
on the US in order to empirically confirm the ideas of innovation differences be-
tween Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies. Many of
the worlds most innovative countries have close ties to the US, which may suggest
that international relations may play a role, and not only domestic institutions.
The role of the state in sponsoring R&D is also downplayed in the VoC literature,
where the main arena of innovation is within the firms. Looking at universities
or research regarding national defense, state-provided research plays an important
role(Taylor, 2004).
When comparing institutional coherence and macroeconomic performance(Kenworthy,
2006), the empirical evidence did not give much support, if any to the coherence
hypothesis from the original VoC article. There were no significant relationships
between coherence and performance, and several ”non-coherent” countries per-
formed just as well as the most coherent ones. This is the case for Denmark,
which has labour market institutions similar to those in LMEs (i.e. the ”flexicu-
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rity” system). I will use this framework to explain the characteristics of Norwegian
working life, but also specifically the case of the ERAMET factory. My main objec-
tive is to adress the differences between working life in Norway and other countries,
and also to see if the Norwegian model might contribute to increased productivity.
According to the Varieties of Capitalism hypothesis, it is not unlikely that Norway
will have a working life which has significantly different institutional design than
other European countries. In the following section I will look at the character-
istics of working life in Norway, and differences between Norway and the Nordic
countries in areas such as employment quality and unemployment.
3 The European Labour Market - Is Norway Different?
The European Labour Market is characterized by large institutional differences
between countries(Davoine et al., 2008). While some countries are characterized
by relatively fluid and unregulated markets for labour and capital, others have
higher levels of employment protection(OECD, 2004) and are more characterized
by collective bargaining and state intervention. The degree of collective bargain-
ing and union density varies greatly between countries, from 85% of the workforce
being members of unions in Iceland to 10% in Lithauania2. The degree of employ-
ment quality and worker participation also varies greatly, which is discussed in the
following.
The highly flexible labour market and low welfare costs have been mentioned as
one of the reasons for the good macroeconomic performance of the US in the
90s, where the rising unemployment and stagnation of the continental European
countries in a similar way were attributed to rigid and regulated labour markets.
Although some administrative procedures and regulation of temporary contracts
have a negative effect on performance, the most important reason for the superior
economic performance was mainly due to more advanced technology and higher
skill levels within the different industries. However, the different tax levels and
general labour market policies could not account for the differences between the
US and the rest of Europe (Aiginger, 2005). Unemployment in Europe rose after
2See Appendix
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the financial crisis, but the impact was very different from country to country.
While unemployment in Spain rose from 11,8% in the third quarter of 2008 to
20% in the second quarter of 2010, it went from 2,5% to 2,6% in Norway. The
main differences I will look at will be the differences in degree of participation and
cooperation between Norwegian working life and other European countries, and
differences relating to employment quality. I will then review some of the literature
on how these two measures may influence productivity and economic performance.
3.1 The Norwegian Welfare State and Labour Market
Characteristics of the Norwegian Welfare State
I will in the following differ slightly from the original LME/CME and discuss some
of the main varieties of welfare states. One of the main critisisms of the VoC
theory is that it does not take into account some of the main differences between
countries in Europe, and also the differences between i.e. CMEs in continental
Europe and Japan (Hancke, 2009). This thesis focuses on the Norwegian/Nordic
welfare state, and even though the coordinated market economies share several
similarities, I will point out some of the main characteristics of the Nordic welfare
model, in comparison to similar systems in Continental Europe. The welfare state
consist of government provision of some goods, like education and in some coun-
tries health care, and also redistribution of income between different individuals.
The liberal welfare model and the countries which the model applies to this is very
similar to the earlier characterization of LMEs. It applies to countries such as the
US, Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland, and also to an increasingly larger
degree the UK. These systems are characterized by lower tax levels, and a more
contingent and less generous benefit systems. Benefits related to unemployment
and retirement, and to a varying degree medical benefits are linked to employer
and employee contributions. In the CMEs, however, there are some differences
between countries in Europe associated with the conservative welfare model3 and
the Social Democratic countries4 .Generally, in the countries with a conservative
3Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy
4Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland
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welfare model, there are both higher tax and benefit levels than in the liberal
model, but less generous than the Social Democratic countries. The replacement
rates5 of unemployment are higher in the Social Democratic countries than in
continental Europe. Sickness benefit replacement rates are generally higher in
the Social Democratic countries than in the conservative countries, however, this
varies within the Nordic countries (100% coverage in Norway, and 59% coverage
in Denmark). The proportion of the labour force that is covered by collective
bargaining is also higher in Norway than the other Social Democratic countries
and the conservative countries, and Norway has the second highest welfare state
generosity score, only surpassed by Sweden (Clausen Jochen, 2007).
The Norwegian welfare model has a number of benefits which are not contingent
on earlier income, such as child benefits and health benefits. Other benefits such
as maternity leave, unemployment benefits and retirement benefits are contingent
on earlier contributions. In the following I will mainly focus on the work related
aspects of the welfare state, especially collective bargaining and the social security
system. I will also give a brief introduction to the Norwegian cooperation trials,
which influenced the legislation around working life to a large degree(Finsrud,
2009).
The National Insurance Act
The Norwegian state provides insurance against different kinds of income shocks
through the National Insurance Act.
”§ 1-1. Forma˚l Folketrygdens form˚al er a˚ gi økonomisk trygghet ved a˚ sikre in-
ntekt og kompensere for særlige utgifter ved arbeidsløshet, svangerskap og fødsel,
aleneomsorg for barn, sykdom og skade, uførhet, alderdom og dødsfall.
Folketrygden skal bidra til utjevning av inntekt og levek˚ar over den enkeltes livsløp
og mellom grupper av personer.
Folketrygden skal bidra til hjelp til selvhjelp med sikte p˚a at den enkelte skal kunne
forsørge seg selv og klare seg selv best mulig til daglig. ”
5The relative size of benefit after taxes to income when working after taxes
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The National Insurance act defines the purpose of the National Insurance. The
goal is reducing income insecurity and also to do some redistribution of income,
and the idea of helping people help themselves is important.
Collective Agreements and Wage Bargaining
The collective agreement between the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
(LO) and Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NAF/NHO) was first signed in
1935. Motivated by the reccesion, the destructive conflict level in some industries
and the joint wish of continued competitiveness, the agreement was formed. The
interests of export industry were therefore very imporant in the collective wage
bargaining, which meant that international trade became an important factor in
labour market institutions, and also in wage development. The conflict level in the
labour market was also greatly reduced, and from being one of the most conflict-
ridden labour markets in Europe, Norway reduced the conflict level to almost
non-existence. Earlier literature suggested that the differences in union density
decided which impact unionized labour had on the labour market. The research
was mostly focused on the inefficiency effects of unionized labour. Calmfors and
Driffil introdused their model arguing that the inefficiency loss connected to union-
ized labour was smaller when there were either a very low or very high degree of
union centralization(Calmfors et al., 1988). Later, studies have suggested that the
impact on economic performance mainly stems from the union coverage and not
the union density, which found no or little support for the hump-shaped theory
(Aidt, 2002) (Aidt, 2008).
The collective agreement created the ground rules for bargaining and cooperation
between the employer and the employee. In addition, it also include the workers
influence on managerial decisions. The agreement is revised continously, usually
every fourth year, and after the first agreement in 1935, supplementary agreements
concerning work environment, gender equality, technological development, working
hours and part time work were added. Later on, there have been several ”collective
agreements” between employer and employee organizations. Some of the major
influences on employment legislation in Norway are the Norwegian cooperation
trials. It is therefore worth mentioning the motivation behind these trials, and the
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effects they had on Norwegian working life.
The Norwegian Cooperation Trials - LO/NAF
The Norwegian Cooperation Trials were conducted in 1962. The main motivation
for the changes in the way employment was organized was the idea of democracy,
and the labour market as an arena for democratic development (Herbst 1971,
1976). Increasing democracy in the workplace would then spread to other areas
of the society, including educational institutions, family and community, adminis-
tration and research (Gustavsen et al., 2010).
This was the first time Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NAF, later re-
named NHO) and LO cooperated on a research and development project related
to this area. The different companies were chosen on the background of being lead-
ers in their respective field – and in Norwegian industry in general. The main idea
was to try to introduce self-directed teams and increase the degree of workplace
democracy. After the trials, the knowledge aquired should be spread democracy
out to other firms in order to increase efficiency, innovation and democracy. This
effect would then disperse into society in general. However, despite the great suc-
cess of many of the cooperation trials, the dispersion effect did not seem to occur,
even though the results of cooperation trials were well known among researchers,
taught at universities and presented at seminars. Even within the firm where the
trials were done, the ideas did not disperse. Some accredited the success of the
trials to the general success of the firm itself(Finsrud, 2009). Some firms even shut
down the part of the production connected to the trials because the differences
in work practices introduced by the trials seemed ”incompatible” with the rest of
the firm(Finsrud, 2009) (see section on Christiania Spigerværk). The dispersion of
knowledge from the cooperation trials also happened through legislation, and the
results from the trials were very much involved in designing The Agreement on
Working conditions by including psychosocial factors and the right to participate,
in the legislation. I will briefly mention two of the factories which participated in
the cooperation trials.
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Christiania Spigerværk - The Thread Factory
The interest among the general industry to participate in the experiment was small.
The democratic ideas which the project was based on, were in conflict with the
main Taylorist ideas which were prevalent in the industry. Chistiania Spikerværk
agreed to participate in the project, but only if the thread factory could be the
area to conduct the experiment, since it was already ridden with problems, and
the possibility of a worse performance was low (Gustavsen et al., 2010).
After the project started, cooperation contributed to a higher level of produc-
tion than earlier. The higher level of productivity also lead to an increase in the
performance-based wages for the workers at the thread factory, and the inequal-
ity in wages and status which followed were a source of conflict. Therefore, the
local union was highly resistant to the project, and suggestions for technologi-
cal improvement from the workers were largely ignored by the engineers. After
three months, the project ended and the thread factory went back to its original
production process. Several of the employees left their jobs due to disappointment.
Hunsos Factories
The next factory which participated in the project,was Hunsos Factories. They
worked in wood processing, and were about to implement a new cellulose pro-
cess in their production. This process was concidered to be complicated, and the
management wanted to cooperate with the workers to find the best possible pro-
duction method. With the experience with Christiania Spigerværk in mind, the
top management was largely involved in the project design, in order to avoid the
problems that occured when workers were ignored by the engineering staff, the
union was resistant to the more performance based salary scheme because of the
wage inequalities it created6.
The main idea was to use team based work, where the shift managers were re-
sponsible for large parts of the operation. This practice also lead to more multi-
tasking, and also transfering of skills between different vocational groups. After a
year, the Hunsos Factories continued on the technological and organizational de-
6This issue is also discussed in the section about ERAMET
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velopent themselves, and the production continued with success for several years
(Gustavsen et al., 2010).
The Basic Agreement Part B – Cooperation Agreement
“The object of this agreement is to strengthen and further develop cooperation
between the employees, their representatives and the management in the individ-
ual enterprises and groups of companies”7
Work councils
Work councils shall be established in enterprises with more than 100 employees,
and in addition be established in enterprises with less than 100 employees if it is
requested from one of the parties and the central organizations agree.
“The main task of the works council is, through cooperation, to work for the most
efficient production possible and for the maximum wellbeing of all who work at
the enterprise.”8
In short, the work council shall be informed by the management on financial status
of the enterprise, and sales and production conditions. In addition, the works
council gets access to the same financial information as the shareholders receive.
Substantial changes in modes of production, investments, plans for expansion,
reductions or restructuring shall be submitted to the council before making any
decicions. The council shall establish guidelines for vocational training if necessary,
guidelines for new employeesm, and authority to implement safety measures.
The Agreement on Working Conditions
As an expansion to the main collective agreement signed in 1935, an expansion
named ”Arbeidsmiljøloven” Agreement on Working Conditions), covers most of
the workers in Norway, with a few exeptions9. The agreement sets a baseline on
what kind of working conditions are legal, and a deviation away from the agree-
ment in the disfavour of the workers is not possible. This agreement included
7From the Basic Agreement
8From the Basic Agreement
9See Arbeidsmiljøloven
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psychosocial factors and the participation and involvment of workers in working
conditions related areas.
Working Environment Councils
The worker influence in Norway is large, and supported by legislation based on
cooperation and collective bargaining. However, the question still stands: Does
Norwegian workers have more autonomy and influence on managerial decisions
than other countries in Europe? And does this participation matter?
3.2 Working Life in Norway and The Collective Agreement
Discretionary learning at workplaces is correlated with high levels of innovation,
and also with the level of training provided to employees (Arundel et. al, 2007).
The Norwegian collective agreement specifies that the employer needs to provide
some form of work-related training if it is considered neccesary, which could con-
tribute further to an increase in both the number of firms with workers discretion,
and also to the amount of innovation in the workplace. Because of the risk asso-
ciated with achieving spesific skills, some degree of income and work security is
needed. The Norwegian Insurance Act contributes to this, by securing unemploy-
ment benefits, and the collective agreement by ensuring some work security.
Norwegian respondents reported high levels of work satisfaction, only surpassed
by Denmark, and Norway is also the European country with the lowest percent-
age of workers working more than 48 hours a week.10 There is a clear tendency
that employers with either learning or LEAN mode of production invests more
in education and training of their employees, where the effect is greatest in the
learning model. Fixed-term contracts are more often used in firms using the LEAN
model, while Taylorist production is more associated with temporary employment
practises. Employment contracts of unlimited durations are also more common in
firms with a learning production.
The degree of regulation in the labour market has been mentioned as one of the rea-
sons for the differences in types of production methods between countries. There
10Fourth European Working Conditions Survey
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is some support for this, in the form of a positive correlation between the strength
of the national vocational training and degree of learning forms of production
in a country. Employment protection may increase the degree of advanced work
organization, since it increases the ability of adopting new practises.
3.3 Production Models - A Brief Introduction
When looking at different types of production models, some characteristics are
often mentioned, such as autonomy, degree of hierarchy, complexity of tasks and
coordination. Job autonomy is often measured by the degree of having a choice
of working partners, being able to take a break, choosing or changing the speed of
work, methods of work and order of tasks.11.
Simple Model
This type of production is characterized by informal and non-codified work, often
used in service industries such as retail, hotels and restaurants and other forms of
personal service.
Learning Model / Discretionary Model
The learning model is characterized by a high level of work autonomy and task com-
plexity, and a widespread use of semi-autonomous work groups(Kalleberg et al.,
2009). As the name suggests, this model of production also has a high degree
of learning and problem-solving. The learning form of production is especially
developed in the more advanced service sector of the economy (banks, business
services and so on). The learning model is most common in countries with reg-
ulated labour markets, with a high level of employer coordination around areas
such as pay and vocational training, and are most common in the Nordic countries
and the Netherlands (Edward and Antoine, 2005).
11Fourth European Working Conditions Survey
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LEAN/Japanese Model
The LEAN model is characterised by team-work and problem solving groups, rigid
quality standards and production norms, and has a more hierarchical structure
than the learning model. The degree of autonomy in work is smaller than in the
learning model, and the tasks are often standardized. The LEAN model is often
found in different areas of manufacturing, and is most common in the UK, Ireland
and Spain (Edward and Antoine, 2005).
Taylorist Production
The Taylorist Production can be looked at as a variety of the assembly line pro-
duction, where the workers have very limited and often repetitive tasks, with a
high degree of specialization. Taylor was a firm believer in division of labour as a
way to improve efficiency, and replacing rule-of-thumb behavior with a scientifical
approach to every operation done in the production. Because of the limited qual-
ifications needed to perform relatively simple tasks, the business does not need
to invest significantly in training of the workers. This makes the workes easily
replaceable, either by less expensive labour, i.e. immigrants or outsourcing pro-
duction to low cost countries entirely, or by replacing workers with machines. Low
or non-existent worker’s discretion also reduces the amount of in-house innovation
(Arundel et. al., 2007). Teams and job rotation are prevalent, which may sug-
gest that these types of work may be included as a mere tool for cost reductions,
often called ”flexible Taylorism” (Edward and Antoine, 2005).Taylorist modes of
production are most common in southern European countries.
When considering the different work organizations, both teamwork and job rota-
tion were higher in Taylorist and LEAN companies than companies that focused
more on discretion and learning. This might imply that the mere presence of team-
work, job rotation etc. is not necessarily a good signal for innovation and learning,
but might actually be seen as a way to overcome some of the Taylorist limita-
tions in respect to monotony and to get the workers more involved, but without
including worker’s discretion to the same degree as in LEAN or learning models.
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3.4 The Effect of Participation on Productivity, Performance and Qual-
ity of Working Life
The effect of an increase in productivity is not necessarily beneficial for the work-
ers. There is a conflict of interest between management and workers in how the
profits gained from the productivity increase should be shared. The management
may want to increase productivity without increasing payouts whatsoever (Grim-
srud and Kvinge, 2006).
We can separate between different types of participation, in order to examine the
different effects. Management-led involvment implies that workers may express
their opinion and share information and experiences with the management. How-
ever, this does not include any control rights or rights to return.
Profit-sharing schemes and employee ownership is another part of participation.
This type of involvement puts an extra risk on the workers (in the employee own-
ership case) because both income related to work and savings now are dependent
on the success of the same enterprise.
Representative participation is the last type of participation, which includes some
sort of control rights to workers. Examples of this is Work counsils, working
comittees, unions and workers’ representatives on board of directors (Grimsrud
and Kvinge, 2006).
How does participation improve productivity? Participation may improve com-
munication and lower transaction costs of information sharing, it may improve
conflict resolutions and increase the willingness to accept new technology (Brown
et al., 1999).
As mentioned earlier, a profit-sharing scheme may reduce the moral hazard prob-
lem by reducing the conflict of interests between workers and management. If
workers are more in control of their own working situation, this may also reduce
this conflict (Grimsrud and Kvinge, 2006).The increased control rights may also
contribute to negotiation of less productive work practices, which may decrease
productivity (Frick, 2002).
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The net effect of participation on productivity seems to be influenced by the insti-
tutional settings in the economy. If one or more of the types of participation are
present, this seems to increase the productivity gains of the other types (Grimsrud
and Kvinge, 2006).
Based on the 2003 Norwegian survey of working conditions, some of the effects of
participation on employment quality were examined, such as levels of skill develop-
ment, workload, support, ambiguity and stress. The authors used three dimensions
of participation. These were autonomy in work tasks, consultation on organiza-
tional decisions and team work. They got their data from the Survey of Living
Conditions in 2003, and used this to measure the relevant variables of work satis-
faction and employment quality.
There are several positive effects of participation on working life, but the picture
is mixed. Consultation on organizational desicions reduced the work load for both
men and women. It also reduced ambiguity, which increases job satisfaction. Au-
tonomy reduces stress, both for men and women, and was also positively related
to skill development and a higher work load for men (possibly because of the in-
creased responsibility). When looking at team work, they found a positive effect
between team-work and stress. The effect of the increased work-related stress in
teams was especially notable in unsupervised teams. Self-directed work groups
increased work loads and ambiguity for women (Kalleberg et al., 2009).
One reason for the mixed effect of participation may be the incentives for firms to
engage in these types of work practices. If team work or other new practices are
introduced in order to enhance quality, innovation and learning, the effects will
not be the same as for the firms introducing team work as a form of intensifying
production (Kalleberg et al., 2009).
The macroeconomic performance effects of participation are not the main focus
of this thesis, but I will mention some of them briefly. The effect of coordinated
bargaining seems most important when there is change in the economy, where this
can increase the efficiency of responses to different types of economic shocks. Cen-
tralization of collective bargaining internalizes externalities of higher wages such
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as unemployment and inflation, and improves economic outcomes (Aidt, 2008).
3.5 Comparing Norwegian and European Employment Quality Indica-
tors
Some literature suggests a correlation between employment quality and productiv-
ity and performance (Judge et al., 2001). Low levels of work satisfaction are linked
to long or non-standard working hours, high levels of work intensiy, low levels of
job control and exposure to physical and psychosocial risks.12 Earlier literature
has found a “Scandinavian effect” when looking at the employment quality levels
between the EU-15 countries. This effect was apparent both in the area of partic-
ipation, workplace training and the share of untrained workforce, which was the
smallest in Europe, and this regional effect was significant even after introducing
several control variables (Gallie, 2003). 13 This suggests that there may exist
some regional similarities and effects in relation to employment quality. In order
to compare the quality of working life in Norway with the rest of Europe, I will use
the LAEKEN indicator study, a study of employment quality in the EU countries.
This study was based on a survey in the different countries, looking at indicators
such as quality of employment, financial security, education and training, gender
equality, job security, level of unionization, productivity and influence.
3.6 Background - Monitoring Employment Quality in Europe
The LAEKEN indicator study (Davoine et al., 2008) was a study of employment
quality in the EU countries. Wages were not taken much into consideration in
this survey, because it was shown that as long as you had a minimum of financial
and job security and not lower wages than colleagues and peers, the actual wage
level was not that important. Some wage indicators were included, especially to
capture any ”working poor”. Possibilities for career advancement, were considered
to be much more relevant.
12Fourth European Working Conditions Survey
13With one exeption: When introducing controls, the regional effect of employment quality
was only apparent for the women from Finland, and not the men
27
After measuring the levels of the different indicators, Davoine et al. sorted the
different EU countries into different “clusters” according to the scores, and looked
for institutional similarities in countries with similar scores. The data was based
on national statistics and acconting data, and survey data, mainly from the Euro-
pean Working Conditions survey. The survey data covered the area of percieved
job satisfaction and other subjective measures. To compare Norwegian data with
this analysis, I have used data from EUROSTAT and Statistics Norway. I will
also look at the development of these indicators over the last 10-15 years where
the data allows it. Because of limitations of existing data in Norway, some of the
indicators used in the survey are not covered.
Main Findings
Educational level
Norway has got one of the highest levels of public expenditure on education as
a percentage of GDP. As seen from the data, the nordic countries has generally
got the highest amount of expenditure, and Cyprus also uses a high share of the
GDP. Only Denmark has got a higher expenditure per pupil/student than Norway.
The general, educational level in Norway is very high, and over 30% of the adult
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population has some form of higher education, and less than 30% has only primary
education14 With the increase in the general educational level, and the great re-
duction in unskilled labour, your career is to an increasingly larger degree decided
by your initial educational level.
In general, the Northern and East European countries had high scores in rela-
tion to educational levels and educational expenditure, in the Nordic countries
this corresponds well to the idea that Coordinated Market Economies will have
an extensive educational system and vocational training in order to supply the
labour market with high-skilled labour. The lowest educational levels were found
in the Southern European countries. The rest of the Continental Europe had an
”average” distribution of higher and lower education.
Income
“Working poor” are defined as individuals who are working, but still are at risk
for poverty after social transfers. A high level of working poor indicates low em-
ployment quality. In Norway, 6% of the persons employed are at risk of poverty
after social transfers. This is below the EU-27 average which is 8%. The highest
levels of working poor are found in the Mediterranean area and in some Eastern
European countries such as Romania (18%) and Poland (12%). Norway perfoms
about the same on this measure as the other Nordic countries. Since these data are
based on at-risk for poverty after social transfers, the generous welfare system in
the Nordic countries may reduce the number of working poor, in comparison to the
Mediterranean countries. The new EU countries have a higher share of unskilled
low-wage jobs with poor career possibilities. The continental EU countries have
some part time employed labour, but a small degree of working poor.
Wage Inequality
When we consider the wage inequality, we look at the ratio of the top and bottom
20% of the income distribution, with the equivalized disposable income 15. The
14Education at a glance,OECD,2009
15The equivalized disposable income is the total income of a household, after tax and other
deductions, that is available for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members
as equalized (made equivalent) adults. They are made equivalent as each is weighted according
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Eastern European and Mediterranean countries have the highest levels of income
inequality, followed by continental Europe, and the Nordic countries together with
Eastern European countries.
It has also been suggested that bargaining centralization, female labour-force par-
ticipation and government employment have different effects with respect to the
effect of wage inequality in LMEs and CMEs (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000) . This
implies that policies successful in LMEs might fail in CMEs and vice verca.
Working conditions
Some of the indicators influencing working conditions, are indicators such as work-
related stress, uncomfortable working posititons, involuntary part-time work, wage
levels and career opportunities. I will cover all of these briefly.
Workers in Norway are covered by the Agreement on Working Conditions. When
looking at data measuring physical working environment problems, the numbers of
people needing medical attention because of their working environment has been
greatly reduced in the last 10-15 years16. In general, there are low reported levels
of uncomfortable working conditions in Norway and in the Nordic countries, these
are most common in the new EU countries and Greece. One notable exeption to
this is the reported level of work-related stress. Work-related stress is associated
to their age using the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale
16See Appendix
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with low work satisfaction in all the non-Nordic countries, but in the Nordic coun-
tries, the reported level of job satisfaction is high despite of the high level of stress.
Intensifying working conditions are negatively related to employment quality, but
not in the Nordic countries.
Gender Employment Gap
Norway has one of the highest female labour participations in the world. The
general tendency in the Nordic countries is to have larger differences between men
and women inside of the labour market (more wage inequalities), but much more
gender equality in employment. This is not a surprising result, considering that
Mediterranean countries are characterized by the fact that women with lower lev-
els of educations stay out of the labour market. This contributes to large gender
differences in employment, but small gender differences in wages since the female
labour force is generally higher educated.
The gender employment gap in Norway has decreased gradually over the time pe-
riod. However, the effect is not only due to an increase in female labour market





The gender unemployment gap is relatively small in Norway. After 1999, both
female and male unemployment increased, but the male unemployment increased
at a higher rate. After 2005, the rates became more similar again, but after the
financial crisis, there seems to be another divergence.
Involuntary part time, by gender
Involuntary part time by gender is much larger for women than men. One possible
explaination for this is that more women than men are employed in the health




Age inequalities in the labour markets
To consider the possibilities of inequalities in age in employment, I looked at EU-
ROSTAT data.
The main conclusion following the survey was that the differences in employment
quality to a large degree originated in differences between the institutions in the
different countries. An important reason for this is that changes in the same indi-
cators (such as work-related stress, or work intensity) yielded very different results
in relation to job satisfaction. The strong correlation between employment rates
and employment quality, does not imply that there is a trade-off between number
of jobs and employment quality, at least in the EU-15.
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Limitations
There are some methodological difficulties with the way the survey has been done.
Some questions may also have been interpreted differently in different countries
and cultures, especially the different subjective parameters, such as workplace re-
lated stress. Some indicators may also have some political motivation. Indicators
about workplace injuries etc. are based on the changes from year to year instead
of absolute numbers.
3.7 Employment Quality and Job Performance
Employer-provided training and lifelong learning are usually thought to increase
employment quality. The collective agreement focuses on the right to work related
training, and workforce skills and training are known to be positively related to
productivity performance at sector and firm level. A high turnover in the indus-
try, another possible indicator for less influence and cooperation, are also naturally
negatively linked to workforce training. The workers have reduced incentives to
gain work-spesific skills, and employers may be reluctant to invest in an ”unsta-
ble” workforce. The extreme case is japanese firms which hire some people for
the rest of their working life, therefore eliminating the incentive problem and the
risk connected to investing in workforce training. This leads to a large openness
to new technology from the workers point of view since their jobs will never be
threatened by technological progress (Katz and Darbishire, 2000).
Functionalist organizational theory supports the idea that work autonomy co-
varies with the skill level of the workers. If a high level of skill is connected to a
larger degree of worker autonomy, lower-skilled countries will have less autonomy.
However, large surveys comparing skill levels and autonomy find cross-national
differences (Dobbin and Boychuk, 1999).
A literature review of the correlation between job satisfaction and job performance
at individual level when combining qualitative and quantitative studies on the area,
found a significant relationship between these variables at 95% level (Judge et al.,
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2001). Earlier meta-analyses has concluded with smaller correlations, such as
Michelle T. Iaffaldano and Paul M. Muchinskys influential article which concluded
that the correlation between satisfaction and performance were low (.17) and that
much of the variability in the data were due to small sample sizes and unreliable
measurements (Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985). As a result of this, there were
a decline in the number of published papers on job satisfaction in the 90s and a
declining interest in work satisfaction as a field of study. However, a later meta-
analysis on job satisfaction found a true correlation between job satisfaction and
job performance by 0.30 which were statistically significant (Judge et al., 2001).
These kinds of studies has also been carried out at business level. A study con-
ducted based on 7,939 business units in 36 companies, looked at different aspects
of employee satisfaction, and generalizable relationships were found between unit-
level employee satisfaction and business-unit outcomes. The different measures
were consumer loyalty, profitability, employee turnover and safety variables. The
main hypothesises were that business-unit satisfaction and engagement would have
positive effects on the business-unit outcomes, and that these correlations would
generalize across organizations for all the business-unit outcomes. The Gallup
survey consisted of one overall satisfaction measure, and 12 other satisfaction
measurements including cooperation, feeling of importance and meaning at work,
degree of positive recognition and so on. The satisfaction data were aggregated at
business-unit level and correlated with the different performance measures. All of
the performance variables showed positive correlation with the satisfaction mea-
sures, but profitability and productivity were higher correlated than the other
variables. 17. This might imply that improving employee satisfaction may increase
business unit outcomes, including profits (Schmidt, 2002).
3.8 Institutional Sustainability in Norway
”To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings
(..) would result in the demolition of society.”
Karl Polanyi - The Great Transformation
17The methodological difficulties with perception studies are further discussed in the discussion
section
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Another important issue is the sustainability of the Norwegian work practices.
Institutions supporting cooperation, coordination and representative participation
are not guaranteed to survive. There is a widespread belief that globalization would
lead to convergence in political economic systems, where neo-liberalism would be
the only competitive alternative. In that case, globalization would lead to institu-
tional changes in coordinated economies.
The idea of institutional convergence is not new. There has been a widespread
”common knowledge” that increased openness in markets and international trade
would lead to institutional convergence in the countries open for trade. This has
motivated a widespread anti-globalization movement in order to secure the welfare
state, environmental quality and job security. Anti-corporatist ideology has also
motivated globalization resistance.
The view on institutional convergence is often similar to the ”Race to The Bottom
hypothesis”. The supporters of the ”Race to The Bottom” hypothesis argue that
in order to accomodate global capital, the national states have to stay competitive
in the capital market by reducing taxes on capital, and reducing og removing en-
vironmental and labour protection. The capital holders would have the ability to
perform ”institutional arbitrage”. Another hypothesis focuses on the possibility
of policy convergence as an effect of supranational institutions and transnational
governance (Drezner, 2001).
Another possibility is that instead of institutional convergence, there are actually
divergences between countries in order to accomodate different parts of the world
market or production. Using the varieties of capitalism approach to institutional
change, I will argue that changes in the Norwegian institutional structure would
have to come from mutually beneficial improvement. Because of the codepen-
dence of the different institutions, and the possibilies of institutional complements,
changing a single one of them would not neccesarily be beneficial. The empirical
evicence of policy convergence in globalized economies is weak, and some of the
literature suggests that the different countries actually diverge in their policies and
modes of production, in order to take advantages of any institutional advantages ?.
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The union power has an effect on public policy and firm behavior. There are large
differences in Europe in regards to the influence of the trade unions, and they are
not neccesarily correlated with the share of union members in the workforce. One
example of this is France, where only 8% of the working population are members of
a trade union, but the trade unions in France have substantial power, and union
leaders are frequently consulted on public and work policy issues. Deliberative
institutions such as cooperation between unions and employer organizations which
makes collective wage bargaining possible, are not as attractive if they are not
accompanied by other national characteristics such as strong unions. In liberal and
deregulated labour markets, deliberative institutions are not necessary to ensure
a good outcome, and it is therefore not especially important. Changing a single
institution would therefore not guarantee to lead to a Pareto improvement (Hancke,
2009).
4 ERAMET-Norway
In this section I will present the case of ERAMET Norway, a manganese produc-
tion company, which has three factories in Norway. ERAMET Norway has a flat
organizational structure and has focused on cooperation between employees and
the management on all levels. I conducted interviews with the CEO of the com-
pany, Odd Husmo, the leader of the local union, and also with a shift cooperator,
and a production manager.
In 1999, the french mining company ERAMET Comilog bought two manganese
raffineries from ELKEM, one in Sauda, and one in Porsgrunn. Odd Husmo con-
tinued working as CEO of the factory in Porsgrunn and also became CEO of the
factory in Sauda. ELKEM sold out because of the lack of access to cheap raw




ERAMETs management philosophy is based on the X and Y theory by Douglas
McGregor, which is based on two different views of management, namely Theory
X and Theory Y.
Theory X
This form of management focuses on close supervision of workers on all levels,
motivated by a view of workers as lazy and unproductive. The sole motivation
of workers is money, which in many ways does not differ greatly from the way
economists view working. Workers left alone will shirk, and also avoid responsi-
bility if they can. As a consequence, the tasks that the workers are supposed to
do have to be narrowly defined and easily controlled and measured. This type of
management needs a hierarical organization with many levels, and delegation and
innovation and ideas of improvement are provided downwards from the manage-
ment. This form of management may somewhat resemble the standard Taylorist
production. It has also been shown that there is a correlation between a level of
trust in a society, and the degree of workers discretion (Arundel et. al., 2007).
This is not surprising according to the X/Y theory, as distrust is seen as one of
the main motivations for hierarchy and control.
Theory Y
This management style is based on the view that workers may have other moti-
vations than just their salary, and that they will, even in the absence of direct
supervision, impose self-control and do what is asked of them. This implies that
the workers have to accept more responsibility for their own actions. Because of
workers discretion, there is a substantial degree of innovation upwards, where the





ERAMET Norway has eight board members, where four are representatives from
the owner side, which includes the chairman of the board, three are employee
representatives and one is a so called ”local resource”. The employee representa-
tives include two representatives from the unions (the leaders of the industry and
energy branch of LO in Sauda and Porsgrunn, respectively) and one white-collar
representative. The white-collar representative is locally elected in the Porsgrunn
and Sauda factory every two years, and the two factories take turns in having their
representative at the board of directors.
BU meetings
As given from the Basic Agreement part 2 – The Cooperation Agreement, all firms
covered by the agreement with over 100 employees are obliged to arrange works-
council(BU) meetings. 18 The objective of these meetings is to provide information
about the firm, which includes strategy plans, financial situation and so on, and
the meetings have no desicion making power. In agreement with the local union,
the frequency of these meetings have been reduced because of the efficient flow of
information within the firm, and the BU meetings are used as an arena to present
more long-term goals and discuss spesific issues instead.
Daily Operator Meetings
In addition to the board, BU and AMU meetings, ERAMET Porsgrunn also has
daily operator meetings, where the daily production is discussed, tasks are dele-
gated and where problems related to the last day’s production, maintenance needs
and so on are discussed. The meetings are open to everybody who wants to con-
tribute with something. In addition to this, the operators of each shift have a
meeting with their supervisor once every five weeks (Shift meetings).
18Works councils are more generally discussed in section 2.
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4.3 Production
Autonomous work groups are used in the entire production. The plant operates
24 hours a day, but the management is only present at daytime. The rest of the
workers are spread on 5 different shifts throughout the day, with 13 employees at
each shift. 11 of these employees are employees at ERAMET, and 2 are external.
Every shift has one coordinator which deals with job rotation inside the shift, sick
leaves and substitutes, and also some conflict management. The coordinator also
reports to the director, which does not interfere with the team unless they explic-
itly ask for it. Every operator has the possibility of applying for the coordinator
position, and this position is filled biennialy.
Multiskilling and multitasking is performed at some level. Even though the factory
does not have many workers with vocational training in more than one vocation,
there are six different tasks on each shift, and the workers are supposed to be able
to do at least three of them19. In practice, however, this is not always followed
through, as some of the workers, especially older workers who have done the same
tasks for a long number of years, often are less interested in task rotation, and the
degree of rotation is decided by the shift coordinator.
The LEAN management theory which is dominant in several industries, has also
influenced the ERAMET production structure. The idea of standardizing some
procedures is essential. ”The production is more specialized now than it has been




As seen from the figure below, the headcount in the factories in Sauda and Pors-
grunn steadily decreased from 1999 to 2001. ERAMET Comilog demanded a
restructuring of the production process in order to increase profitability. This re-
structuring was done by offering voluntary redundancy to employees. This practice
19Raskere, høyere, sterkere - Ledelse for okt produktivitet - Utredning for Norsk Industri:
Kompetanse og arbeidsliv 2008
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was done in cooperation with the local union, which agreed to participate in the
restructuring as long as there would not be any involuntary lay-offs. Because of the
implementation of more advanced work practices, new workers were hired every
year to meet the increased need for highly qualified workers. After the financial
crisis, demand for manganese plummeted. ERAMET Porsgrunn and Sauda shut
down some of their production, and the work hours were reduced by 50% for most
of the employees.
Employee turnover and downsizing
After the Porsgrunn and Sauda factory were bought by ERAMET Comilog, the
factories faced a serious restructuring process. The number of workers should be
approximately halved, together with large investments in equipment and capital
from the French owners. The LEAN model of structurization, standardization and
teams was implemented in order to ensure cost control. ERAMET managed to
increase their liquid production, while reducing their headcount significantly as
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seen on the productivity figure.
Education level, and training in the workplace
”When it comes to employee training, it is possibly our weakest point” - Odd
Husmo.
The majority of the operators at ERAMET Porsgrunn have vocational training
(approximately 70%). The operators without training are offered subsidized voca-
tional training. 2-3 operators also have tertiary education. In the control rooms,
vocational training is a requirement.
Wages
The base level wage for vocationally trained operators in ERAMET Norway in
2010 is 33753 NOK every month. But there are some differences in wages between
the operators, according to level of education and responsibilty. Operators with
coordinator responsibilities earns an additional 14 000 NOK, and operators with
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responsibility in case of an emergency recieves an additional 9000 NOK every
month. ”We had some cases where workers with the same responsibilities and
work descriptions recieved different wages. Both the workers involved and the
rest of the firm wanted to get rid of this inequality, and we managed to solve it so
these kind of differences disappeared. Even though there are some wage differences
between the operators, issues in regards to differences in status and prestige are
non-existent. All the operators have the same status, if they are crushing stone,
melting it or getting it ready for shipment” -Torgeir Larsen, Local union leader.
4.4 The Story About the ERAMET Comilog Factory in Dunkirk
The manganese factories in France have a completely different approach to manage-
ment and work practices than ERAMET Norway. French working life in general
is more hierachically structured (3-4 levels from the bottom to the top). Em-
ployees have little influence over management decicions, in board meetings deci-
sions are seldom made, they are made by the CEO in his office after the meet-
ing, and announced afterwards. In addition to the manganese factories in Sauda
and Porsgrunn, ERAMET Comilog had one factory in the US and two factories
in France, one in Dunkirk and one in Bologne. The Bologne factory was shut
down in 2004, but the Dunkirk factory is still running. As ”restructuring in the
form of reduncancies and similiar efforts are not heard of”, the Dunkirk factories
had to find other ways of cost control in the times of difficult market conditions.
The solution was to stop the increase in wages, and no redundancies have been
made, with the exeption of in 2009 (see Appendix). This is made possible be-
cause of the high levels of unemploymemt. However, the cost of this is social
unrest and difficult working conditions, and the conflict level is high in the fac-
43
tory.
Although ERAMET Norway have been laying people off, the union have been
cooperative in this process under the one condition that no one was laid off in-
voluntarily. The ongoing dialogue between both union, workers and management
both informal and in BU and AMU meetings increases information flows and re-
duces tension. 20
5 Summary
In this section I will summarize the most important characteristics of working life
in Norway described in the thesis, and also look at how the relevant literature
answers the following questions: How does the institutional structure in Norway
influence working life? Is the “Nordic model” with high levels of participation and
cooperation linked to higher productivity and/or employment quality? And are
the Norwegian institutions sustainable?
I first looked at different kinds of institutions as a way of resolving coordina-
tion problems. The Varieties of Capitalism approach suggests that you will find
20The content of this subsection are my own reflections from my interviews conducted with
Odd Husmo, in addition to the supplied data.
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differences in production and innovation across countries because of institutional
differences. I found that collective bargaining and representative participation in-
fluences work practices. Wage compression following collective wage agreements
reduces inequality in income and wages both for men and women, in addition to
special agreements regarding gender equality. The cooperation agreement states
that the enterprises are responsible for supplying work related training and ed-
ucation if necessary. This implies that the institutional structure in the labour
relations have has a positive effect on employment quality, and facilitates produc-
tion with great autonomy and with highly skilled workers.
How does work practices connected to participation such as worker autonomy,
self-directed teams and representative representation contribute to employment
quality? Autonomy in the workplace decreases stress and increases skill develop-
ment, which contributes to higher employment quality. When looking at data, I
find that Norway has similar characteristics as the other Nordic countries on em-
ployment quality indicators such as educational level, gender equality in the labour
market (although there is a large gender segregation between different sectors), and
wage inequality. They are also similar with regards to having have a high level
of work intensity which is not associated with low work satisfaction. In general,
Norway is characterized by high-quality jobs and high employment satisfaction,
and is similar to the other Nordic countries with similar institutional structures.
Meta-studies looking at the correlation between job satisfaction and job perfor-
mance find a positive relationship between the two variables. However, the impact
of job satisfaction and the views on how reliabile the different studies are, vary.
Because the studies are cross- sectional, it limits the possibilities of saying any-
thing about the causal relationships between these two variables. In addition,
some of the data regarding productivity gains of implementing new work practices
are self-reported, such as supervisors rating of performance, which has a tendency
to overrepresent the effects caused by changes in work practice.
Participation and cooperation have a positive effect on the quality of employment
in the economy. However, the success of a single institution may depend on the
existence of other institutions in the economy. Existence of institutional com-
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plementarities increases the sustainability of successful institutions when facing
challenges such as globalization and demographic changes, but it may also limit
the benefits of introducing successful work practices or institutions in countries
with different institutional structures due to the lack of possible institutional com-
plementaries.
Self-directed teams and teamwork in itself is is not a guarantee for high-quality
employment in general. As seen in the Tayloristtic and LEAN production models,
the ppresence of team work alone does not necessarily imply worker’s discretion
or a higher levels of on-the- job training. When considering the possibility of
institutional convergence due to globalization, the evidence for a convergence in
work practices is weak, and institutional advantages as discussed in section 2.2.
may actually lead to a divergence between countries because of specialization on
production which utilizes the institutional advantages.
When considering the qualitative comparison between ERAMET Norway and ER-
AMET France, I found considerable differences in how the production process was
organized, even though the end product from both factories was very similar. Be-
cause of differences in both cooperation opportunities with unions and the human
capital available for the management, two similar factories have chosen very dif-
ferent models with went in very different directions in regards to work practices.
This illustrates how Norwegian (and Nordic) work life is often characteristically




§ 12.8 Works council activities The main task of the works council is, through
cooperation, to work for the most efficient production possible and for the max-
imum wellbeing of all who work at the enterprise. In enterprises that have joint
works and working environment councils, the council shall handle, in addition to
the statutory duties of working environment committees, the following areas of
work that otherwise would pertain to the works council. A practical division of
the work must be arranged if both separate councils are maintained.
The fields of activity are:
Informative and confidential reports from the management on the financial status
of the enterprise and of its standing in the industry, as well as on other matters of
importance for production and sales conditions.
In this connection, financial information shall be provided in writing to the same
extent as it normally is given to shareholders through the financial statement sub-
mitted at a company’s annual general meeting. When so requested by council
members, opportunities shall be provided for reverting to the accounts at a sub-
sequent meeting of the council.
Matters that are of material importance for the employees and their working con-
ditions which relate to the activities of the enterprise, substantial investments,
changes in systems and methods of production, quality, product development,
plans for expansions, reductions or restructuring, shall be submitted to the coun-
cil for its opinion before any decision is made.
Reports on the activities of the enterprise and any existing plans for operations in
the immediate future.
Such reports shall be provided and discussions shall take place at the earliest op-
portunity, to enable the council to deliver its opinions soon enough to influence
the final decision.
47
If matters as mentioned in this section are to be dealt with by the board of di-
rectors or corporate assembly of the enterprise, the council’s statement shall be
included with the relevant documents, unless lack of time has made it impossible
to obtain such a statement.
The council shall work for sound and proper rationalization. By work to provide
information, it shall promote understanding of the great importance rationaliza-
tion has for the community and for the enterprise.
The council has the authority and the responsibility to establish such general
guidelines as its members may agree on for vocational training for the employees
of the enterprise. The same applies to guidelines for new employees. Moreover the
works council can Within a fixed budgetary limit, the management may give the
council authority and responsibility for implementing safety measures. This does
not limit the decisionmaking powers of the working environment committee under
the Working Environment Act.
Within a fixed budgetary limit, the management may give the council authority
and responsibility for implementing social welfare measures. The management
shall deal as soon as possible with matters on which the council has given an opin-
ion, and shall inform the council of its decision at the next meeting of the council.
When the matters referred to in paragraphs 2 through 9 of this section are being
discussed, information given by the enterprise shall be kept absolutely secret to
the extent enjoined by the management.
The works council itself should concentrate on work and measures of a general
nature relating to the enterprise as a whole or to large sections of it. Otherwise
as far as possible the council should delegate authority and responsibility to the
departmental councils in matters which can be decided at departmental level.
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At Risk For Poverty After Social Transfers (2008)


































1989 1993 1996 2000 2003 2006
Utsatt for sterk varme, * 7 7 6 4 4 4
Utsatt for sterk kulde, * 8 8 8 8 7 8
Utsatt for d˚arlig inneklima, * : : : 34 32 28
Utsatt for støv, gass eller damp, * 16 18 14 9 13 8
Utsatt for hudirriterende stoff, * 10 9 8 7 7 8
Utsatt for vann p˚a huden flere ganger i timen : : : : 16 16
Utsatt for d˚arlig arbeidslys, * 7 8 8 6 6 4
Utsatt for passiv røyking, * 12 12 7 6 5 3
Utsatt for sterk støy, * 8 9 8 8 7 5
Utsatt for vibrasjoner, * 6 6 8 6 5 4
Arbeider s˚a hardt at du puster raskere * : : : : 8 7
Sitter p˚a huk/st˚ar p˚a kne * 8 8 10 6 8 8
St˚ar eller g˚ar * 55 53 57 53 55 54
Ma˚ løfte i ubekvemme stillinger * : : 9 8 6 7
Arbeider med hendene løftet * 10 10 10 8 8 8
Arbeider i framoverbøyd stilling utan støtte * 12 11 10 10 9 4
Arbeider i andre stillinger som belaster ryggen
*
14 13 13 14 : :
Arbeider med gjentatte eller ensidige bevegelser
*
34 33 35 36 36 38
Arbeider sittende to timer el mer uten a˚ kunne
reise seg, strekke p˚a bena
: : 10 : 4 3
Løfter minst 20 kg 5 eller flere ganger daglig 18 16 17 15 14 13
Løfter minst 10 kg 5 eller flere ganger daglig : : 23 21 19 20
Stor risiko for arbeidsulykker : : 7 6 6 6
Stor risiko for belastningsskader : : 22 20 25 21
Stor risiko for andre helseplager : : 9 6 8 6
Antall sysselsatte 4436 3818 2135 2536 2561 9961
* = mesteparten av tiden = ’nesten hele tiden’, ’3/4 av tiden’, ’halvparten av
50
tiden’. Source: Statistics Norway
51












2006 Gml 46 39









































Collective Agreements in Europe
Collective Agreements Proportion of
Workforce in
Trade Unions
Austria Yes, 80% 47%
Belarus No 80-90% (0)
Belgium Multilevel within private sector (90%) 60%
Bulgaria Yes, weakly adhered to 18% (1)
Croatia Bargain in good faith 50%
Cyprus Not legally enforcable and limited to
Northern area
2% / 60% (2)
Czech Rep. Yes, company agreements 14-15%
Denmark Yes (85%) 75%
Estonia Yes (15%) 10%
Finland yes - widespread 80%
France yes - multilevel - (90%) 8%
Germany Yes (67%) 23%
Greece yes 30%
Hungary Yes (40%) 23%
Iceland Yes (95%) 82%
Ireland yes - widespread 33% (3)
Italy yes - widespread 30%
Latvia Yes - company and sector level 20%
Lithauania Few - and mainly at workplace level 10%
Luxembourg Yes 50%
Malta Yes 63%
Moldova Yes - enterprise level 40%
Norway yes - widespread and effective 55%
Poland Yes - company level mainly 14% (4)
Portugal Yes - widespread at all levels 30%
Romania Yes - mainly public sector 40%
Russia Yes - only one permitted per enterprise 50% (5)
Slovakia Yes (mainly sectorial) 10%
Slovenia Yes - extensive 35%
Spain Yes (85%) 15%
Sweden Yes - widespread 80%
Swizerland Yes (50%) 25%
Ukraine Yes -national agreements sectorial level 66%
United King-
dom
Yes - almost wholly at plant/company
level private sector
26% / 17% (6)
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EU-27 60 1,6 9
EU-25 61 1,6 9
Belgium 63 1,6 12
Bulgaria 29 1,1 4
Czech Republic 72 1,9 14
Denmark 85 2,7 10
Germany(1) 69 1,3 9
Estonia 67 1,6 7
Ireland 67 2,2 12
Greece 21 0,6 3
Spain 47 1,2 9
France 74 2,3 13
Italy 32 1,2 7
Cyprus 51 1,3 7
Latvia 36 0,8 4
Lithuania 46 1,2 5
Luxembourg 72 2 16
Hungary 49 1,9 6
Malta 46 1,8 11
Netherlands 75 2 12
Austria 81 1,4 9
Poland 35 1,3 6
Portugal 44 1,1 7
Romania 40 1,1 5
Slovenia 73 2 14
Slovakia 60 1,8 12
Finland 77 1,5 10
Sweden 78 2,1 15
United Kingdom 90 1,3 7
Norway 86 1,3 9
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(1) (including ex-GDR from 1991)
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2000 199 365 64 513
2001 90 331 80 512
2002 -73 322 60 484
2003 251 374 58 478
2004 1046 391 101 523
2005 560 365 143 508
2006 347 396 85 508
2007 1014 402 112 521
2008 3035 367 217 558
2009 -904 261 51 481
2010 574 426 103 600
2011 (est) 457 446 258 618
2012 (est) 391 463 224 613
2013 (est) 394 424 149 627
2014 (est) 440 465 102 641




1999 581 18 10
2000 565 29 13
2001 517 57 9
2002 522 10 15
2003 485 40 3
2004 455 34 4
2005 414 47 6
2006 401 25 12
2007 395 26 20
2008 383 38 26
2009 368 21 6
2010 358 16 6
2011(est) 352 10 4
2012(est) 333 23 4
2013(est) 328 10 5
2014(est) 326 7 5
2015(est) 326 6 6
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Operating Result, Production and Turnover ERAMET Comilog Dunkirk, France
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Salaires 3 434,3 3 290,0 3 331,0 3 174,8 3 344,7 3 437,2 3 619,8
Participation 597,0 478,4 97,0 526,0 689,7 0,0 91,0
CAP / Salaires -29,7 -48,4 -13,6 28,3 7,5 -19,2 0,0
Inte´rim 276,2 185,5 243,0 358,6 322,9 116,4 100,0
Total frais de
personnel
4 277,8 3 905,4 3 657,4 4 087,6 4 364,8 3 534,4 3 810,8
Personnel
de´tache´
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 24,0 0,0
Autres frais de
personnel
90,9 117,9 121,6 122,0 163,7 144,2 185,0
Entretien
courant
862,5 767,9 805,4 806,6 935,0 868,9 800,0
Gros entretien 832,0 582,5 752,7 889,6 569,8 500,9 600,0
Autres 561,2 585,9 613,5 616,9 694,3 576,9 674,4
Macofa 326,5 288,5 353,3 332,8 392,1 315,4 309,0
Location 598,2 452,1 525,9 596,1 595,0 535,1 533,9
Recherche et De-
veloppement
136,2 117,5 107,1 102,6 219,7 199,3 150,0
Sous-traitance 350,6 336,3 306,4 299,5 357,1 218,8 231,0
Sous-total 8 035,9 7 154,2 7 243,4 7 853,7 8 291,5 6 917,8 7 294,2
Management
fees
700,0 840,0 899,0 935,0 392,0 378,0 385,0
Assurance 668,2 393,7 273,7 231,1 243,8 354,0 384,3
Impots 1 367,0 397,0 572,6 943,5 1 838,9 376,2 280,0
Assurances et
impoˆts
2 035,2 790,7 846,2 1 174,6 2 082,8 730,2 664,3
TOTAL 10 771,1 8 784,9 8 988,6 9 963,4 10 766,3 8 026,0 8 343,4
Amortissement 1 433,5 1 477,3 1 531,3 1 241,0 1 300,0
Frais fixe pro-
duction
9 934,9 7 827,3 9 416,0 10 403,1 11 685,9 8 689,7 9 108,4
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